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Abstract
This paper models the optimal provision of incentives to corporate scientists, within an
environment where e¤ort is multidimensional, rms compete on the product market, knowledge
spills over across companies, and scientists have both monetary and non-monetary motivations.
The simultaneous consideration of these aspects generates a number of novel results. First,
knowledge spillovers lead rms to soften incentives in order not to benet competitors, but only
when product market competition is high. By contrast, greater knowledge spillovers positively
a¤ect the provision of incentives when competition is low. Second, the relationship between
the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is U-shaped, and the region where the
relationship is positive is smaller the higher the knowledge spillovers. Finally, both the incentives
for applied and basic research increase with non-pecuniary benets scientists obtain from basic
research, while a trade-o¤ between monetary pay and non-monetary rewards may occur at the
level of the xed salary. These results provide a novel interpretation of some observed R&D
organizational choices by companies, o¤er insights for the management of scientic and other
creative workers, and have implications for public policy.
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Introduction
Managing scientic workers and dening e¤ective incentives for them has long been a challenge
for business organizations, and is considered a key determinant of competitive success. Large
established companies struggle to attract and provide strong incentives to top scientists, in order
to keep at pace with scientic and technological advances. New entrepreneurial companies in high-
tech and science-based sectors, in particular, are often founded by academic scientists, or are built
around their discoveries. The survival itself of these ventures depends on their ability to attract and
productively manage talented scientists.1 At a time of tighter public budget constraints for several
public research agencies (Bridges 2006), moreover, companies might be called on to increase their
role in the production of knowledge, including the performance of basic research. Understanding the
challenges companies have in the organization of innovative activities, and in particular in providing
incentives to scientic workers, is therefore of importance for entrepreneurs and managers, as well
as for policy makers.
The empirical literature on the provision of incentives to corporate scientists has focused on
some specic aspects of this organizational problem. Stern (2004), for example, hypothesizes (and
empirically nds) a negative relationship between the wage corporate scientists receive, and whether
they are allowed and pursue their own research agenda in addition to the rms projects, and to
publish. This negative relationship is interpreted as consistent with the presence of a "taste for
science" for which scientists are willing to pay in terms of lower monetary salary. Sauermann
and Cohen (2007a) provide evidence on the positive impact of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
motivations of scientists on the innovative performance of companies. Cockburn et al. (2006)
focus on the multitask nature of scientic research, e.g. the performance of basic and applied
research activities. They argue that rms try to dene incentive mechanisms in order to balance
the performance of these activities. The incentive instruments, moreover, are complementary, i.e.
they co-move in the same directions following changes in other relevant environmental conditions.
Little e¤ort has been made, however, to elaborate theoretical frameworks in order to analyze
the major, peculiar challenges that companies encounter in motivating scientic workers, to assess
whether the available evidence on specic contexts is more broadly generalizable and applicable
to other environments, and ultimately to inform empirical scholars as well as managers and policy
makers. The aim of this paper is to propose such a theory. We contend that the provision of
incentives to scientists needs to be analyzed as in relation to two broader environmental conditions:
competition among rms in the product market, and spillovers of knowledge across companies.
Furthermore, scientists heterogeneous motivations, both monetary and non-monetary, must be
taken into account.
A model is proposed, where two rms compete in an industry by o¤ering di¤erentiated products.
1See Leslie (1980), Dennis (1987), Henderson and Cockburn (1994), Zucker and Darby (1995), Lamoreux and
Sokolo¤ (1999), Lacetera et al. (2004), Lerner and Wulf (2006), Andersson et al. (2006), Lacetera (2007), Sauermann
and Cohen (2007).
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Each rm is composed of an owner and a scientist. The owners are in charge of choosing quantities
(i.e. competition is à la Cournot), while the scientists are in charge of choosing two types of cost-
reducing e¤orts. The two e¤orts di¤er in two respects: the rst kind of e¤ort which we call
applied research does not provide non-pecuniary benets to the scientists and does not generate
knowledge spillovers to the rival rm; the second kind of e¤ort we call it basic research provides
non-pecuniary benets to scientists but it spills over to the rival rm. E¤orts are not observed by
the owner, who o¤ers to the scientists a wage contract contingent on observable signals. The signals
can include, for example, patents and scientic articles. A recent literature has indeed documented
that even prot-oriented organization let their scientists publish their research, and reward them on
the basis of their standing in the community of peers, as expressed for example by their publication
record.2 The model, therefore, embeds the incentive provision problem for corporate scientists in an
environment where research activities are multidimensional, knowledge spillovers occur, scientists
have multiple motivations, and rms compete on the product market.
The model produces three main sets of results, characterizing the optimal (linear) contract for
the scientists. The rst set of result concerns the relative strength of incentives for applied and basic
research, as a function of the level of competition and knowledge spillovers. We obtain that the
relative strength of incentives for applied research is increasing in the level of knowledge spillovers,
and more so when competition among the rms is higher. For the higher is knowledge spillovers,
the higher is the cost of providing incentives for basic research, since this benets the competitor
as well.
The second set of results concerns instead the absolute strength of incentives, again as a func-
tion of competition and spillovers. The e¤ects of knowledge spillovers on the provision of incentives
depend crucially on the competitive conditions in the product market. Greater knowledge spillovers
positively a¤ect the provision of incentives only when competition is low: in this case, providing
strong incentives does not benet rivals so much. In more competitive environments, the impact
of higher knowledge spillovers on the incentive scheme is ambiguous, since providing stronger in-
centives to R&D workers can hurt the rm while beneting competitors. With high competition,
not only do incentives for basic research e¤ort, which produces spillovers, decrease as spillovers
become more pervasive. We show that it is optimal also to mute incentives for applied research
e¤ort, even if it does not generate spillovers. In turn, if knowledge spillovers are low or non-existent,
rms provide the strongest incentives for basic and applied research both when they face very little
competition and when competition is very high. In the former case, rms are bigger and cost
reduction through R&D e¤ort has a large impact on prots. In the latter case, cost reduction has
a proportionally higher impact on prots, which are low due to the competitive pressure. Thus,
the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives to scientists is U-
shaped. In contrast, when there are high level of spillovers, the strength of incentives is decreasing
in the intensity of competition.
2Henderson and Cockburn (1994), Hicks (1995), Kinney et al. (2004), Stern (2004), Cockburn et al. (2006).
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These two sets of results highlight the importance of the interactions between the conditions
in the product market and in the transmission of knowledge, as key determinants of a companys
R&D organization. Most of the existing empirical studies of the determinants of incentive schemes
to corporate scientists abstract from these environmental conditions, potentially leading to biased
estimates.
Finally, the third set of results concern the impact of a scientists non-monetary motivation or
taste for science from the performance of basic research on her pay scheme. Both the contingent
part of the wage related to basic research e¤ort, and the contingent part related to applied research,
increase with non-pecuniary benets scientists obtain from basic research. The response of scientists
to steeper incentives is stronger when they also have intrinsic motives, leading to a large reduction
in production costs, larger size and higher prots for the rm. Thus, companies optimally provide
stronger incentives for basic research. In order to keep balance between the di¤erent tasks that
scientists are called to perform, companies reinforce the incentives also for applied research, even if it
does not produce non-monetary benets to the scientists. A few studies argue that, since scientists
care about their reputation through the performance of basic research companies might pay them
lower wages if they allow the scientists to participate in the activities of their community of peer
and possibly reward them also on the basis of their standing in the scientic community (Stern
2004, Aghion et al. 2005). However, it is not unheard of that some scientists receive very high pays
for their services to companies, while at the same time enjoying autonomy and job satisfaction (Lee
2002). While complementarity between monetary incentives and non-monetary motives exists, we
nd that a trade-o¤ between monetary pay and non-monetary rewards can occur at the level of
the xed salary. Empirically, one would therefore need to distinguish between xed and contingent
components of a scientists wage, in order to properly study the relation between monetary pay
and intrinsic motivations.
In addition to interpreting the empirical evidence on the provision of incentives to corporate
scientists, the model o¤ers insights for the organization of R&D to entrepreneurs and managers.
Our results stress the importance for rms to look at their position in the product market when
designing their internal R&D organization. The model also informs on how to deal with researchers
with di¤erent degrees of interest for monetary pay and for their reputation. Finally, considerations
for a broader set of organizational issues and classes of workers can also be derived. For, other
creative workers, such as in advertising or the arts in general, as well as in the health sector, may
receive non-monetary benets from some of their activities. From a public policy standpoint the
results imply that, when competition in a given industry or submarket is low, a weak knowledge-
appropriability regime may be optimal in order to stimulate the performance of basic research
without excessively hurting rmsprots. Conversely, stronger IP protection may be required in
order to stimulate innovation in more competitive environments. This complementarity between
IP protection and antitrust laws is consistent with cross sectional evidence from several countries
(Ganslandt 2008). Furthermore, policy makers should be aware that any interventions aimed at
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encouraging companies to stimulate one type of research will translate in companies designing
incentive systems that balance di¤erent types of e¤ort. The response to such policies will therefore
be "softer than expected", if evaluated only in terms of one single dimension.
The model in this paper shares some similarities with previous theoretical works. Schmidt
(1997), Raith (2003) and Vives (2004) analyze the provision of incentives to managers as they
are a¤ected by competition on the product market. Spence (1984), Qiu (1997), and Zhang and
Zhang (1997) consider the presence of spillovers in R&D investments. Murdock (2002) considers a
principal-agent model where agents also have intrinsic motivations. Our work builds on the insights
of these studies, and extends on them by analyzing the impact of multidimensional e¤ort, following
the multitask agency theoretic approach pioneered by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994). In
addition to making the model more realistic for the analysis of incentive provision to scientists, the
combination of these elements generates novel results and insight.3
The model is developed and solved in Section 1. The implications of the model, in terms
of strength and complementarity of the incentive instruments under di¤erent environments, are
analyzed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the robustness of the model to alternative assumptions,
and uses the model to interpret the existing empirical evidence on the determinants of incentive
provision to scientists and to propose novel tests. Managerial and policy implications are also
analyzed. A summary of the results and an outline of further avenues of research conclude the
paper in Section 4. Appendix A summarizes the notation of the model. All of the proofs are in
Appendix B.
1 The Model
1.1 Set up
The model is built as a four-stage game whose timing is represented in Figure 1 below.
t=1: firm i and firm j
propose a wage
contract (a0, aA, aB)i
and (a0, aA, aB)j to
scientist i and j,
respectively
t=2: the scientists
choose the amounts of
(non-contractible) effort
(eiA, eiB) and (ejA, ejB)
t=3: the
scientists
are paid
t=4: firm i and firm j
compete on the
product market, and
profits are realized
Figure 1: The games timeline
A detailed description of the games set up follows. Two rms, i and j, compete on the product
market à la Cournot. The inverse demand function for rm i is given by:
3Our study is also similar in spirit to Athey and Schmutzler (1995). Although in a di¤erent framework, these
authors relate "shorter term" decisions, such as whether and how to exploit an innovation opportunities, to "longer
term" organizational choices, such as the denition of incentive schemes to R&D workers.
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pi = A  qi   qj ; (1)
where pi is the price, qi is the quantity, and  2 [0; 1] is a parameter indicating the intensity of
competition with the rival rm j: The limit case of  = 0 reects the rms being monopolists
in separate markets. The opposite limit case of  = 1 represents the standard case of Cournot
competition with homogeneous products.4 The total cost function for rm i is:
TCi = ciqi: (2)
The marginal cost ci is a function of the (unobservable, unveriable) e¤ort that a scientist, hired by
the companys principal, exerts. E¤ort has two dimensions: applied (eAi ) and basic (e
B
i ) research.
The marginal cost, in turn, is non-contractible. The relation between marginal production costs
and scientic e¤ort is:
ci = c  eAi   eBi   eBj ; (3)
where c is a constant and  2 [0; 1]: Scientic e¤orts reduce marginal costs, e.g. by facilitating
process innovations. In addition, the e¤ort in basic research of rm js scientist a¤ects the marginal
costs of rm i. Basic research activities by a company generate spillovers of knowledge to other
companies, whose intensity depends on the size of the parameter : Notice that  and  are
independent, i.e. the intensity of knowledge spillovers between companies need not be related
to the intensity of product market competition. Even when product markets are separated, for
instance, the relevant knowledge that allows innovation for one product can be relevant for the
other product. R&D activities aimed at a given product (or market segment) may indeed benet
rms in other segments. Finally, while di¤erent geographical areas may be isolated in terms of
nal product competitions (e.g. by regulation), researchers can still communicate and di¤use their
knowledge through other channels. Conversely, rms may operate in similar markets, and compete
ercely, but use di¤erent technologies. In this case, high product market competition may be
accompanied by low knowledge spillovers.5
The scientists derive utility both from monetary rewards, and from the possibility to engage in
basic research activities. In addition to caring about money, scientists therefore have a "taste for
science". E¤ort costs are quadratic and separable. The utility function of a scientist hired by rm
i has a negative exponential form:
4As shown by Singh and Vives (1984), the inverse demand function in (1) can be obtained by the maximization
problem of a representative consumer with utility function: U(q1; q2) = A(q1 + q2)  (q
2
i+2qiqj+q
2
j )
2
:
5As an example of research aimed at a given market segment that ends up being relevant for di¤erent segments,
consider the research for cardiovascular-related diseases that turned out to be useful for the correction of erectile
dysfunctions (Kling 1998, Pietsch 2006). Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) and Rosenberg (1994) o¤er further examples
of inter-industry knowledge spillovers. Alcacer and Zhao (2007) document that even rms located near each other
that employ similar technologies may operate in di¤erent markets, and rms competing with each other may employ
di¤erent technologies.
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Ui =   exp

 r

wi + e
B
i  
A(eAi )
2
2  
B(eBi )
2
2

; (4)
where r is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion,  > 0 is the degree of taste for science and
(A; B) 2 R+ X R+ are parameters inversely related to the productivity of applied and basic
research. We will generally assume r > 0, though will consider a few results also under risk
neutrality.
The non-contractibility of marginal costs and prots does not allow the scientists wage to be
contingent, say, on prots. The rm proposes an incentive contract on other veriable measures.
The veriable signals, XA and XB, are functions, respectively, of eA and eB, and of stochastic
shocks. Think of these signals as some observable measures of a scientists e¤ort in applied research
e.g. the number or the value of the obtained patents and in basic research e.g. the number
or relevance of the publications a scientist has. In fact, there is evidence that rms base their
performance pay on these measures (Henderson and Cockburn 1994, Cockburn et al. 2006).6
Dene:
XAi = e
A
i + "
A
i ; (5)
XBi = e
B
i + "
B
i ; (6)
where ("Ai ; "
B
i )  N(0; 0;2A; 2B;AB): We assume that AB < 1r 2(2 )AB(+2)2(2 ) , i.e. that the
correlation in the shocks on patent and paper production is not too high. This assumption, as we
will see, is made to simplify the analysis. The wage schedule rm i proposes to scientist i takes a
linear form:
wi = 0 + 
AXA + BXB: (7)
The variables 0; A and B are under the control of the rm. The set up for rm j is fully
symmetrical to that for rm i as just described.
Notice, nally, that knowledge spillovers, in the model, do not occur directly through publica-
tions or patents. It is implicitly assumed that the rms can e¤ectively protect their proprietary
knowledge, even when it is made public through either patents or publications. The assumption is
quite obvious as long as patents are concerned, but it is also a plausible choice with respect to publi-
cations: rms typically delay publications of their scientists (and of independent scientic partners)
until condential information and intellectual property are properly protected (Blumenthal et al.
1996, Lacetera 2006). Knowledge spillovers, however, can still occur through more informal and less
6The non-contractibility of costs and prots can be considered as a natural assumption in the context of small,
entrepreneurial rms, where monitoring costs are high, and most nancial information is not public. An alternative
formulation would be to model costs as random functions of e¤orts, while assuming they are contractible, as in Raith
(2003). In this case, we could consider also contracts contingent on prots as in Hart (1983). Or, one could include
in the model the choice of which observables to base the contract on, as in DAmato et al. (2006). However, if signals
for e¤orts are available, contracts contingent on such signals only would be optimal if c was a random variable itself,
and agents were su¢ ciently risk averse.
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veriable channels. These include interpersonal relations and conversations among scientists from
di¤erent organizations, or labor mobility. Plausibly, it is harder for a rm to control these ows
of information. The model captures the di¤erence between "appropriable" and "pure" knowledge
spillovers by having the wage schedule depending on codied measures, e.g. publications (see ex-
pression (7) above), while knowledge spillovers occur directly through the unveriable (by a third
party) e¤ort (as in the cost function (3)). The model also considers the fact that knowledge is
more likely to be transmitted if it is more basic, as it is less rm-specic than knowledge from
applied research, and that the transmission of knowledge is imperfect. The former fact is captured
by having knowledge spillovers occur only through e¤ort in basic research; the imperfection in the
transmission of knowledge is captured by having , i.e. the share of a scientists basic research
e¤ort that benet a rival rm, within the unit interval.
1.2 The optimal incentive scheme
The game is solved by backward induction, starting from the quantity choices in the product
market. The focus is on rm i. The results for rm j are easily obtained.
1.2.1 Market competition
Firm i solves
Max
qi
i = (pi   ci)qi = (A  qi   qj   ci)qi: (8)
Solving for the rst order condition for qi gives the equilibrium quantity and prot:
qi =
A  (2ci cj)2 
+ 2
; (9)
i = [q

i ]
2 =
"
A  (2ci cj)2 
+ 2
#2
: (10)
1.2.2 The scientists e¤ort choice
The e¤ort choices of scientist i are straightforward to obtain, given the incentive scheme and the
taste for science:
eAi =
Ai
A
; (11)
eBi =
+ Bi
B
: (12)
1.2.3 The principals problem
It is convenient to express the scientists utility function in certainty equivalent terms. The prin-
cipals choice of the optimal contract is obtained from maximizing the expected total surplus TS,
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subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (11) and (12) (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987).
The program can be written as:
Max
0;A;B
E(TSi) = i + e
B
i  
 
eAi
2
2
 
 
eBi
2
2
  (13)
r
2
h 
Ai A
2
+
 
Bi B
2
+ 2Ai 
B
i AB
i
s:t: (11) and (12).
Substituting the constraints (11) and (12) as well as the prots i as expressed in (10) where in
turn we plug the marginal cost function (3) we obtain:
E(TSi) =
24 A
+ 2
 
2(c  Ai
A
  (+
B
i )
B
  (+
B
j
B
))  (c  
A
j
A
  (+
B
j )
B
   (+Bi )
B
)
(2  ) (+ 2)
352 (14)
+
 
+ Bi

B
  (
A
i )
2
2A
  (+
B
i )
2
2B
  r2
h 
Ai A
2
+
 
Bi B
2
+2Ai 
B
i AB
i
:
Invoking symmetry i.e. Ai = 
A
j and 
B
i = 
B
j the rst-order conditions become:
@E(TS)
@Ai
=

A  c+ 
A
i
A
+
(1 + )(Bi + )
B
 h
4
A(2 )(2+)2
i
  
A
i
A
  rAi 2A   rBi AB = 0 (15)
@E(TS)
@Bi
=

A  c+ 
A
i
A
+
(1 + )(Bi + )
B
 h
2(2 )
B(2 )(2+)2
i
  
B
i
B
  rBi 2B   rAi AB = 0 (16)
We assume that the second order conditions are satised.7 Solving the system of the rst order
conditions and dening k  (+ 2)2(2  ), we obtain8:
AE =
4k[AB(A c)+A(1+)]
h
4(1+rB
2
B) 2(2 )ArAB
i
8><>:
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i h
Bk(1 + rB
2
B)  2(1 + )(2  )
i
  4(1 + ) ABkrAB 2(2  ) ABkrAB
9>=>;
; (17)
BE =
4k[AB(A c)+B(1+)]
h
2(2 )(1+rA2A) 4BrAB
i
8><>:
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i h
Bk(1 + rB
2
B)  2(1 + )(2  )
i
  4(1 + ) ABkrAB 2(2  ) ABkrAB
9>=>;
: (18)
7This requires: @
2E(TS)
@2Ai
= 8
(A)2(2 )2(2+)2   1A   r2A < 0; @
2E(TS)
@2Bi
= 2(2 )(1+)
(B)2(2 )2(2+)2   1B   r2B < 0;
@2E(TS)
@2Ai
@2E(TS)
@2Bi
 

@2E(TS)
@Ai 
B
i
2
=
h
8
(A)2(2 )2(2+)2   1A   r2A
i h
2(2 )(1+)
(B)2(2 )2(2+)2   1B   r2B
i
 
h
4(2 )
AB(2 )2(2+)2   rAB
i2
> 0:
8Under AB < 1r
2(2 )
AB(+2)2(2 ) , 
A
E and 
B
E are positive when 
A and B are high enough.
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The subscript E stands for "Equilibrium". Although expressions (17) and (18) do not appear to
convey any immediate intuition, a series of comparative statics can be easily performed. These
experiments are the subject of the following Section, where we study the impact of competition,
knowledge spillovers and taste for science on the strength, direction and complementarity of incen-
tive mechanisms.
2 Implications
The model generates results regarding the strength, direction, and relation among the incentive
instruments a rm has under control in order to motivate scientists. The results are reported below
in a series of propositions. We investigate three issues: i) the determinants of the relative strength
of incentives; ii) comparative statics on the optimal incentive contract; and iii) the complementarity
between the incentive instruments. The propositions are preceded by an informal description of,
and the intuitions behind the results. The proofs of all of the propositions are in Appendix B.
2.1 Relative strength of incentives
The higher the competitive pressure on the product market, and the higher the ease with which
knowledge spills over to competitors, the stronger the incentives to perform applied research in
comparison to basic research. Since spillovers occur only through basic research, rms nd it
relatively more protable to reward those activities that, while reducing costs, do not produce
externalities (thus beneting competitors). Indeed, when  = 0 ( = 0), the intensity of competition
(the ease with which knowledge spills over to competitors) has no e¤ect on the relative strength of
incentives. The principal, moreover, provides higher powered incentives for the task which is more
precisely observed. The rm, however, may still not provide full incentives for the more precisely
measured activity, in order to avoid too much unbalance in the provision of the two types of e¤ort.
This derives from the assumption of risk aversion of the agent and of multi-task e¤ort. As expected,
the more applied research is productive, and the less basic research is, the stronger the incentives
to perform applied research in relative terms. Finally, the ratio between the two piece rates turns
out to be independent from the taste for science of the agent: The taste for science will be shown
to a¤ect, instead, the absolute value of the piece rates.
Proposition 1 The ratio between the two piece rates, 
A
B
, is i) increasing in  and ; ii) increasing
in 2B and 
B; iii) decreasing in 2A and 
A; iv) independent of :
2.2 The determinants of the optimal contract
2.2.1 Strength of incentives and knowledge spillovers
In general, the e¤ect of knowledge spillovers (from basic research) on the absolute strength of
incentives is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is positive e¤ect of incoming spillovers: rms
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operate at lower costs and this leads rms to provide stronger incentives both for basic and applied
research. On the other hand, giving strong incentives to scientists benets the competing rms by
reducing its costs though outgoing spillovers, thus increasing its size and prots at the detriment
of the rm originating the spillovers. This has a negative e¤ect on applied research as well, since
rms need to balance the incentives for the two types of e¤orts. The overall impact of the degree of
knowledge spillovers turns out to depend crucially in the intensity of product market competition.
Below, we will show a few numerical examples on the interaction between knowledge spillovers
and competition in determining the optimal incentive contracts, for any possible level of competi-
tion and spillovers (the whole [0; 1] interval for both  and ). Here, we begin with an analytical
treatment of some limit cases, which o¤er most of the intuition on the working of the more gen-
eral case. When rms are close to acting under a monopolistic situation, the negative impact of
knowledge spillovers vanishes. Each rm is reinforced by the spillovers deriving from the other
rm; this reinforcement, however, does not hamper the protability of the originating rms, since
there is no direct interaction in the nal market. As a consequence, rms exploit the cost reducing
impact of knowledge spillovers in full, by reinforcing the incentives to their scientists. This result
shares the intuition of existing results with unidimensional e¤ort (De Bondt 1997). The previous
considerations are formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If ! 0, AE and BE are both increasing in .
When considering the e¤ect of knowledge spillovers (from basic research) on incentives for
applied research (which does not spill over to competitors), both positive and negative forces are at
work. First, there are the e¤ects we mentioned: higher  means higher incoming spillovers (which
positively a¤ect A), but also higher outgoing spillovers (which negatively a¤ects A by making the
competitor tougher). In addition to these e¤ects, there is a positive "substitution e¤ect" that favors
applied research against basic research, following from Proposition 1 above. This e¤ect follows from
assuming multidimensionality of e¤ort and represents a contribution over similar models with one-
dimensional e¤ort, such ad De Bondt (1997). We show that the positive e¤ect unambiguously
dominate when the starting level of spillovers is low, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If  ! 0, AE is increasing in .
Our nal proposition on the relationship between knowledge spillovers and the incentives piece
rates concerns instead the e¤ect of knowledge spillovers on the strength of incentives for basic
research. When the product market is highly competitive and spillovers are high, the negative
e¤ect of outgoing spillovers is particularly strong. In this case, and if non-monetary benets are
su¢ ciently low, a further increase in  has an unambiguously negative e¤ect o B.
Proposition 4 If ! 1;  ! 1 and ! 0, BE is decreasing in .
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2.2.2 Strength of incentives and intensity of competition
We now investigate the relationship between the strength of incentives provided to scientists and
the intensity of competition as measured by . This issue is intimately related to the issue of the
relationship between the intensity of competition and the incentives to innovate, which has been
long debated in economics, since Schumpeter (1943) and Arrow (1962). Again, the interaction
between degree of knowledge spillovers and competition comes to play a key role for deriving the
relationship between product market competition and strength of incentives to scientic workers.
We consider the special case of  = 0, i.e. full appropriability of basic research before moving to
a more general treatment in the next section. In this special case, the shapes of @
A
E
@ and
@BE
@
are similar. In particular, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power
of incentives to scientist is U-shaped, i.e. AE and 
B
E are minimal for an intermediate level of
:9 There are two e¤ects relating  and the incentives to research. If  is small, rms are larger,
ceteris paribus. This provides high incentives for cost-reduction (such an e¤ect can be seen in the
denominator of (9), page 8). If  is large, a rms prots are more sensitive to its own costs (such
an e¤ect appears in the numerator of (9)). It turns out that the overall e¤ect of competition on
incentive strength is minimal for intermediate values of .10
Proposition 5 If  = 0, AE and 
B
E are decreasing in  if  <
2
3 , and increasing otherwise.
2.2.3 Numerical examples
The high number of interacting e¤ects makes the analysis of the general impact of  and  on the
absolute strength of incentives di¢ cult. We studies analytically some special cases above. We now
provide two numerical examples for the overall parameter space of  and . In the rst example,
we assume r ! 0; i.e. scientists are risk neutral. The other parameters are chosen in order to
guarantee that second order conditions are satised for all values of  and .11 Figure 2 shows
three regions for the signs of @
A
E
@ and
@BE
@ . When the intensity of competition is su¢ ciently low,
the positive e¤ect of outgoing spillovers prevail, and both AE and 
B
E are increasing in  (as shown
by Proposition 2). At the other extreme, when both  and  are high, @
A
E
@ and
@BE
@ are both
negative. The negative e¤ect of outgoing spillovers on incentives for basic research is particularly
strong (see Proposition 4). Low investments in basic research lead rms to operate at higher costs,
which is detrimental for the incentives to cost-reduction through applied research e¤orts. Finally,
in the intermediate case the "substitution e¤ect" mentioned above is at work, leading rms to
9This result is similar to Belleamme and Vergari (2006), where only one rm has the access to innovation, as in
Arrow (1962). In their model, innovations are always perfectly appropriable. They do not consider how the results
would change, in presence of knowledge spillovers.
10Whether the strength of incentives is highest in monopoly or in Cournot competition with homogenous products
depends on the precision with which performances are measured.
11The examples are built using the following values: A = 2; c = 1, A = B = 1:5,  = :2: In the risk-neutrality
cases, r = 0, and in the risk aversion examples, r is set equl to 2. Furthermore, in the risk aversion cases we have
2A = 
2
B = 1:5 and AB = 0:002: Additional details on the construction of the examples are available from the
authors.
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provide higher incentives for applied research, which does not generate spillovers to competitors,
while reducing the incentives for basic research, for which spillovers to competitors are present (see
Proposition 1). This leads to @
A
E
@ > 0 and
@BE
@ < 0.
Figure 2: The impact of knowledge spillovers on the strength of incentives, for di¤erent combinations of
knowledge spillovers and product market competition intensities, when scientists are risk neutral.
Figure 3 reports the marginal e¤ect of  on AE and 
B
E . Both are decreasing in  if  <
2
3 ,
irrespective of . If  > 23 , there are three di¤erent regions. If  is su¢ ciently low, then both 
A
E
and BE are increasing in , in line with Proposition 5. For intermediate values of , an increase in
 has a positive e¤ect on AE , but a negative e¤ect on 
B
E :Again, a substitution e¤ect is present,
since higher  particularly reinforces the negative e¤ect of spillovers on BE when  is high. Finally,
for high values of , AE and 
B
E are both decreasing in . In this case, lower investment in basic
research also leads to a reduction in applied research.
In the second example we consider, we assume that the scientists are risk averse (r = 2).
Regarding the marginal e¤ect of  on AE and 
B
E , only two relevant regions exist (Figure 4). In
the rst region, where the intensity of competition is low, AE and 
B
E are increasing in . If  is
su¢ ciently high, instead, we have @
A
E
@ > 0 and
@BE
@ < 0: The intuition for this result is as follows.
Assuming risk aversion instead of risk neutrality increases the cost of providing higher incentives
for both applied and basic research. Then, the decreasing returns to R&D investments (which
come from quadratic investment costs) are less severe, and this leads to favor the type of research
investment which does not spill over to rivals. The same logic would apply following an increase of
A and B (i.e. a reduction in the marginal product of e¤ort) under risk neutrality.12
12For instance, it can be shown that under the same parameterization of rst example, except A = B = 10 and
 = 1; no values of  and  exist, for which both AE and 
B
E are decreasing in .
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Figure 3: The impact of competitive pressure on the strength of incentives, for di¤erent combinations of
knowledge spillovers and product market competition intensities, when scientists are risk neutral.
Figure 4: The impact of knowledge spillovers on the strength of incentives, for di¤erent combinations of
knowledge spillovers and product market competition intensities, when scientists are risk averse.
Regarding the sign @
A
E
@ and
@BE
@ under risk aversion (Figure 5), the picture is qualitatively
similar to the case of risk neutrality. We can notice however, that for  > 23 , the region in which
both @
A
E
@ and
@BE
@ are negative is smaller. This again is due to the operating of less severe decreasing
returns in R&D investments.
2.2.4 Monetary wage and non-pecuniary benets: a trade-o¤?
An increase in the researchers taste for science makes e¤ort in basic research more attractive. This
also makes the cost of providing higher-powered incentives for the performance of basic research
e¤ort less costly for the rm. For, the rm prefers to further reinforce these incentives through the
wage schedule, in order to fully exploit the cost reduction e¤ects of e¤ort. The rm nds it optimal
also to increase the power of the incentives on applied research, in order to keep balance between
the two dimensions of e¤ort. This result on the complementarity between extrinsic, monetary
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Figure 5: The impact of competitive pressure on the strength of incentives, for di¤erent combina-
tions of knowledge spillovers and product market competition intensities, when scientists are risk
neutral.
incentives and the intensity of intrinsic motives is similar to what Murdock (2002) nds. We add
that, when e¤ort is multidimensional, it is optimal for the principal to reinforce incentives both for
the activities that generate non-monetary incentives for the agent, and for those that do not.
Proposition 6 AE and 
B
E are both increasing in :
Together with the investigation of the piece rates in the optimal contract, rms are also inter-
ested in determining the xed component of wage. In the standard case, 0 is simply determined
by the participation constraint, which is binding in equilibrium. We are interested in determining
how the xed wage varies with , the non-monetary benet from basic research. The e¤ect is
a-priori ambiguous. Higher  implies that the scientist obtains a higher benet from basic research.
At the same time, as from Proposition 6, the scientist exerts higher e¤ort in both applied and basic
research, for which it must compensated. Under risk neutrality, it turns put the rst e¤ect prevail,
and then 0 is always decreasing in : Under risk aversion, rms must compensate scientists for
the risk they sustain. For this reason, it may be the case that 0 is increasing in : These results
are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 7 If r ! 0; 0 is always decreasing in . If r > 0; 0 may be increasing in .
Finally, we look at the relationship between the overall expected wage 0+AEE(xA)+ 
B
EE(xA)
and the degree of non-monetary benets as expressed by . We are able to partially characterize
the case of risk neutrality. In particular, we can show that for low  the expected wage is increasing
in , i.e. that the e¤ect on the piece rates prevails. For high , we found examples both for the
case in which the expected wage is increasing and for the case in which it is decreasing in .
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Proposition 8 If r ! 0; the expected wage 0 + AEE(xA)+ BEE(xA) is increasing in  when 
is small. 0 + AEE(xA)+ 
B
EE(xA) may be increasing or decreasing in  when  is high.
2.3 Are the incentive instruments complementary?
Ultimately, R&D managers are interested in the design of a whole incentive system for scientists,
and not only in the most protable choice of each single e¤ort-enhancing measure (Holmstrom
and Milgrom 1994, Cockburn et al. 2006). In addition to considering the impact of the model
parameters on the incentive measures separately, the model also holds predictions on how the piece
rates co-move, following changes in the parameters of the model. Some of the complementarity
results that follow can be derived from the analysis in the previous section. However, a separate
and complete analysis is proposed here, using supermodularity techniques. Notice that a necessary
condition for complementarity is that @
2E(TS)
@Ai @
B
i
 0, that holds whenever AB < 1r 2(2 )AB(+2)2(2 ) is
true, as we assumed. It will be shown, again, that the environmental conditions, and the interactions
among them, are crucial in order to determine whether the available incentive instruments move in
the same direction or not.
2.3.1 Complementarity between Ai and 
B
i ; and changes in product market compe-
tition
The incentive instruments Ai and 
B
i are complementary to  when product market competition
is su¢ ciently intense and spillovers are not too high. When  is high and  is low, the marginal
impact on prots of each type of research is high, and the e¤ects reinforce each other. This result
generalize the numerical examples we provide, with the same logic.
Proposition 9 Ai and 
B
i are complementary in  for every 
A and B if  > (), with
()  23 and 0() > 0:
2.3.2 Complementarity between Ai and 
B
i ; and changes in knowledge spillovers
The lower the intensity of competition ; the less likely that expected surplus, E(TS); is super-
modular in Ai ; 
B
i and  i.e. E(TS) is going to be supermodular for a smaller set of the other
parameter values. When  is low, if a rm provides high-powered incentive in one activity, it op-
erates at lower cost, and then it has convenience to provide high powered incentives to the other
activity as well. In this case, as we argued before, the negative e¤ect of spillover from basic research
is limited (see Proposition 2).
Proposition 10 Ai and 
B
i are complementary in  if  is small.
2.3.3 Complementarity among Ai and 
B
i ; and researcherstaste for science
The following result is equivalent to the nding formalized in Proposition 6 (page 15).
Proposition 11 Ai ,
B
i and  are always complementary.
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3 Discussion
In this section, we rst discuss the robustness of the models results to alternative assumptions.
Second, we argue, through the analysis of three prominent empirical papers, that the model provides
a novel interpretation to some R&D organizational choices of companies. A series of empirical tests
motivated by the model are also proposed. We then explore the managerial and public policy
implications of the ndings.
3.1 Robustness
Our results have been obtained under some specic assumptions, which naturally leads to the
question of their robustness. A few assumptions have been motivated when setting up the model
in Section 1. A few additional assumptions are discussed here. First, we consider only the case of
Cournot competition (with linear inverse demand). Other forms of competition, notably Bertrand,
could have been used. In the case of unidimensional e¤ort, Cournot competition is more conducive
to cost-reducing R&D than Bertrand, ceteris paribus, because of the strategic e¤ect (Qiu, 1997).
With Cournot competition, higher investment in R&D makes the rm tougher in the market and
this discourages its rivals sales, which guarantees further benets. In the Bertrand case, the rms
R&D lowers its cost and induces its rival to cut its price, which is detrimental to both. While the
form of competition a¤ects the level of the piece rates, the e¤ect of intensity of competition and
knowledge spillovers depends on the cross-derivative of prots with respect to applied and basic
research being positive (which would hold also under Bertrand competition), and the degree of
spillovers of basic research being higher than the one for applied research. Incidentally, this last
point implies that our results would be qualitatively unchanged (although less strong) if spillovers
were strictly positive also for applied research therefore, not only is the assumption of quantity
competition not particularly restrictive, but also the assumption of spillovers coming only from
basic research can be relaxed.
Second, in the model the research e¤ort is taken as generating process innovations, i.e. as
reducing production costs. The framework, however, can accommodate product innovation in a
natural fashion. Product innovation can be modeled as an increase in consumerswillingness to
pay for a product. Suppose that the scientistse¤ort, instead of reducing the baseline marginal
cost c, increases the maximum willingness to pay A in equation (1). The rmsprot functions,
and therefore their optimal decisions, will be una¤ected as compared to the case above (see Vives
2006 for a similar argument).
Regarding the result on complementarities between monetary and non monetary incentives,
this hinges on the positive sign of the cross-derivative of prots with respect to applied and basic
research and on the "taste for science" being expressed as positive component in scientists utility
function; for instance, complementarity could fail if it were captured by a lower cost parameter in
the investment function. What is crucial is that scientists would exert basic research e¤ort even
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in absence of any monetary incentives for basic research, and that applied and basic research are
complementary in the prot function.
Another assumption we made is that applied and basic research e¤orts enter linearly into the
cost function. An alternative way would have been to assume (also) an interactive e¤ect between
the two; in particular, the basic research could increase the marginal return from applied research
(possibly without a direct e¤ect). This assumption would add another source of complementarity
between applied and basic research, increasing the likelihood of co-movements of the piece rates.
Finally, the specic form of the utility function, while being convenient for tractability, has no
impact on the results. In particular, higher risk aversion is always substantially equivalent to
higher cost for performing R&D.
3.2 Interpretation of the empirical evidence, and proposals for additional tests
Stern (2004) Stern (2004) investigates whether the R&D orientation of rms leads scientists
to accept lower wages. He nds that rms that allow their researchers to publish their ndings,
or even reward scientists for their publications, o¤er lower monetary wages. Stern concludes that
researchers show a "taste for science".
The model in this paper is in line with this claim, as it includes, through the parameter , non-
pecuniary benets for company scientists when they engage in basic science. Under risk-neutrality,
we show a negative relation between the taste for science and the xed component of wage, but
a positive relationship with piece rates. Furthermore, we show that the overall expected wage is
increasing in  when  is not too high. Using Sterns terminology, we can claim that a "productivity
e¤ect" acts at the level of the performance-based component of wage, while a "preference e¤ect",
i.e. the willingness of science-oriented researcher to give up money in exchange for science, act on
the xed salary (which is what Stern is able to observe). Since Sterns empirical analysis is based
on a sample of young researchers looking for their rst job, and these scientists are likely to have
both a high intrinsic motivation to science, and low risk aversion, our results directly points at his
work.13
An implication of our results, however, is also that it is important to analyze the di¤erent com-
ponents of the wage separately, in order to properly assess the impact of each e¤ect. Furthermore,
two key variables appear as omitted in Sterns study: the competitive conditions in which the
rms operate, and the degree to which research results are expected to spill over to competitors.
Empirical controls for the characteristics of the nal markets, and of the technologies in which the
di¤erent employers are engaged, are therefore warranted.
Cockburn et al. (2006) Cockburn et al. (2006) study the relation between the provision, by
large pharmaceutical companies, of incentives for basic and applied research to their scientists.
13Sauermann and Cohen (2007b) document that scientists working in small entrepreneurial companies tend, in
fact, to be younger and less risk averse than the average corporate scientist.
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They nd evidence for complementarity between these two classes of incentives: when rms com-
mit to high-powered incentives to obtain recognition in the scientic community, they also o¤er
higher-powered rewards for applied activities. The authors do not account for the possibility that
complementarity depends on the competitive environment and the degree of IP protection. In fact,
the theoretical analysis that precedes the empirical part of the paper implicitly assumes a monop-
olistic rm. Competitive pressure, and its interaction with the extent of knowledge spillovers, may
play a major role in the incentive design, however. Cockburn et al. employ data at the level of
the single research program, and control for research program as well as rm xed e¤ects in their
regressions. Arguably, di¤erent research programs refer to di¤erent nal product markets, with
potentially di¤erent competitive and spillovers conditions. An extension of the work of Cockburn
et al. would be to calculate the relation between basic and applied research incentives separately
for each submarket, and compare the sign and magnitude of the estimated parameters across these
di¤erent markets.
Andersson et al. (2006) Andersson et al. (2006) analyze the wage structures of software devel-
opers in rms. They nd that wages are more responsive to performance in more "risky" industry
segments, where riskiness is measured in terms of the 90/50 ratio of product line sales per worker.
The authors o¤er a sorting explanation for their results. Firms in highly risky environment benet
more from having star workers. In order to attract them, rms o¤er a better pay, both in terms of
xed and performance related-wage. Our results point to additional (though not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive) explanations. First, software developers may derive also non-monetary benets from
their work (Lakhani and von Hippel 2003). If developers with higher non-monetary motivations
prefer to work in more risky lines (because success may bring greater "fame" among peers, for
example), then our model predicts that these workers will have steeper performance pay schemes.
Second, a more "risky" industry segment might also be a more concentrated one. For example, the
video game software developing/publishing segment, indicated by Anderrson et al. as the riskiest
in their sample, has experienced increased concentration over the 1990s, up to a four-rm concen-
tration ration greater than 50% in the early 2000s (Williams 2002). The IT-software online journal
SoftwareMag.com publishes a list of the biggest software companies. Among the 100 biggest com-
panies of this survey, only two declare "Database" as their primary product line; eight indicate
software for nancial applications, and nine indicate infrastructure/networking software. Among
these three segments, Anderrson et al. indicate "networking" as the riskiest, and "database" as the
least risky. In addition, intellectual property protection in software relatively weak, and knowledge
spillovers are pervasive.14 If higher riskiness goes together with higher concentration, and intel-
14Graham and Mowery (2003) report that, until the early 1990s, the major form of IP protection for software was
through copyright. A series of court rulings, however, have reduced the power of copyright in preventing imitation by
rivals. In more recent years, companies have increasingly patented their software inventions. Since software patents
have been used in software only recently, the absence of a prior art has made it di¢ cult for examiners to assess the
appropriateness of a patent application. Besides, patent systems around the world, in a typically global industry,
have shown di¤ering degrees of severity in accepting applications. It is reasonable to conclude that even patents
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lectual property protection is weak, then our model predicts that companies o¤er higher powered
incentives in less competitive product lines. This explanation adds to the one o¤ered by Anderrson
et al. in terms of sorting of higher skilled workers into higher risk companies.
3.3 Managerial and public policy implications
3.3.1 R&D organization and beyond
Providing incentives to corporate scientists is a complex problem that requires to consider the nature
of the knowledge that scientists are expected to generate, the monetary and intrinsic motivations
of researchers, and the competitive conditions in the markets where a rm operates. If a company
is positioned so as to enjoy some market power, cost-reducing e¤orts by its scientists are likely
to have a sizeable impact on the absolute level of prots. When competition is more intense,
cost reduction might instead be crucial for survival, thus again leading rms to provide stronger
incentives to scientists for process innovations. The latter case, however, depends also on the degree
to which the knowledge produced by a rmss scientists spills over to rivals. If these spillovers are
high, then incentivizing scientists too strongly results in o¤ering an advantage to rivals. In an
environment where knowledge ows easily, managers and entrepreneurs should be aware that the
organizational responses to market competition may be di¤erent from a world of more "private"
knowledge. Conversely, knowledge spillovers have a very di¤erent nature in highly and weakly
competitive markets. In the former, as said, they o¤er an advantage to competitors which, in turn
backres on the focal company. When competition on the product market is low, by contrast, each
rm is reinforced by the spillovers deriving from the other rm; this reinforcement, however, does
not a¤ect the protability of the originating rms, since there is no direct interaction in the nal
market. A part of business strategy in knowledge-driven industries would therefore be to gure out
whether, in a particular market, the level of competition and the degree of knowledge spillovers are
related or not.
Finally, scientists who are more eager to maintain their links to the scientic community even
when employed by a rm, and allowed by a rm to do so, are not necessarily "cheap". Instead,
these are the scientists that will need to be given more powerful incentives for the performance of
both basic and applied research.
The analysis can be applied to how companies motivate other types of workers. Just as in
the case of rms dealing with researchers, such issues as competitive pressure, leakage of relevant
information, multidimensional e¤ort and multiple motivations are going to be of relevance for other
professions within companies, and for other organizations. Examples includes such industries as
health care and advertising (Gaynor et al. 2005, Von Nordenycht 2007), and such organizations
have only a limited role in the protection of software. Notice, also, that the majority of software patents are held
by non software companies. Finally, job hopping is widespread in the software industry, thus allowing ideas and
possibly secrets to move from one company to another, together with people who carry this ideas. The phenomenon
is particularly strong in the software industry, due to the fact that a large share of rms is clustered in a relatively
small geographical area (Freedman 2006).
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as universities, hospitals, and the military.
3.3.2 Public policy insights
Both the scholarly and popular press have documented a decline, in more recent years, of public
funds for basic research, even to those agencies, such as the NIH, which had enjoyed an upsurge of
funding in previous periods (Bridges 2006). Especially in times of tighter public budget constraints,
companies might be called for having a more active and extensive role in the performance of basic
research. Should we expect companies to fulll this expectation? Considerations on the interaction
between competitive and appropriability conditions, and the multitask nature of research activities,
can o¤er insights to answer this question. In industries where competition is low, say because com-
panies operate in relatively separated submarkets, promoting higher knowledge spillovers through
weaker intellectual property right may lead companies to o¤er stronger incentives to their scien-
tists also for the performance of basic, open science. We have shown that, when companies face
lower competition on the nal market, they have "nothing to fear" from low knowledge appropri-
ability; instead, they nd it even more protable to motivate the performance basic research by
their scientists. Conversely, in industries where IP protection is very strong, competition on the
product market should be particularly favored. These implications of the model lend support to a
complementarity between patent protection and antitrust laws. Ganslandt (2008) shows, in fact,
that there is a strong, positive correlation, across countries, between strength of IP protection and
e¤ectiveness of antitrust regulations.
In a multitask setting like the one modeled in this paper, nally, policy makers need also to
acknowledge that any policy aimed at promoting basic research activities by rms might see a
"softer" response by company than expected. When scientic workers perform multiple productive
activities, companies devise their incentive schemes in order for the overall incentive system to be in
balance. Therefore, in response to policies that facilitate the performance of basic research, compa-
nies might change their incentive structure in order to strengthened incentives for the performance
of basic research, but not to a full extent, in order not to excessively deviate researchersactivities
from other productive tasks.
4 Summary and directions for further research
The model of incentive provision to company scientists developed in this paper is based on four key
claims and assumptions. First, scientist engage in multiple, di¤erent activities when performing
research, e.g. (proprietary) applied and (open) basic research. Second, the immediate outcome
of research activities, knowledge, is only imperfectly appropriable. Third, while scientists are
responsive to the provision of monetary incentives, they also care about less material outcomes,
such as their reputation and recognition in their broader community of peers. Fourth, the provision
of incentives to scientists, and all workers in general, depends on the conditions a rm faces in the
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product market, such as the type and intensity of competition. The simultaneous considerations
of these issues in a single model is novel, and allows for a more realistic representation of R&D
incentive problems, as well as for elaborating novel predictions and implications. We nd that
the relative strength of incentives for applied research depends on the interaction of intensity of
competition and degree of knowledge spillovers. Greater knowledge spillovers positively a¤ect the
provision of incentives only when competition is low, whereas in more competitive environments,
the impact of higher knowledge spillovers on the incentive scheme is ambiguous. The relationship
between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives to scientists is U-shaped, with the
exact shape and slopes, again, crucially depending on the intensity of spillovers. An implication
of these ndings is that incentives for basic and applied research are complementary only if either
competition, or knowledge spillovers, are low. An additional, important results is that both the
incentives for applied and basic research increases with non-pecuniary benets scientists obtain
from basic research, while a trade-o¤ between monetary pay and non-monetary rewards can occur
at the level of the xed salary.
These results have implication for the interpretation of the existing empirical evidence on the
provision of incentives to knowledge workers, and also suggest additional test to be performed. The
previous section has discussed these implication, as well as the insights that the model generates for
managers and policy makers. The robustness and the limits of the model with respect to a number
of alternative assumptions have also been already addressed in the paper. Here we suggest a few
avenues for further theoretical analyses. First, a richer set up would consider rms as di¤ering in
their focus on or their e¢ ciency in di¤erent types of research, as well as scientists di¤ering in their
abilities and tastes for science. A further extension, related to the one just described, would be
to consider also the interaction between the incentive provision problem and the labor market for
scientists. The incentives schemes would be devised also in order to equalize returns across rms,
and if rms and scientists are heterogeneous, matching dynamics would also be relevant to account
for. The model, nally, is developed from the rmsstandpoints, and focuses on competition among
rms. Further development would explore also how the incentive provision problem change, when
rms formally cooperate with each other in R&D.15 In turn, the comparison between competitive
and cooperative outcomes is a natural step in the analysis of the welfare consequences, in addition
to some of the conjectures made in the paper.
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A Notation
Players
i; j Subscripts indicating, respectively, rm i and rm j, as well as
scientist i (agent of rm i) and scientist j (agent of rm j)
Choice variables
Ai ,
B
i Wage coe¢ cient related to the performance
measures XA and XB (see below), chosen by the rms
0 Fixed component of the scientistswage, chosen by the rms
eAi ; e
B
i E¤ort levels in applied and basic research, respectively,
chosen by the scientists
qi Product quantity level, chosen by the rms
Payo¤s parameters
i; j Firmsprots
wi Scientists salary
 Scientistsnon monetary benets per unit of basic research e¤ort
XAi ; X
B
i Performance measures for applied and basic e¤ort, respectively,
used by the rms to determine the scientistswage
2A; 
2
B; AB Variances of the error components of X
A
i and X
B
i respectively,
and their covariance
ci Marginal cost of production
c Fixed component of the marginal cost function
 2 [0; 1] Degree with which scientist js the basic research e¤ort reduces the
marginal cost of rm i (indicator of the intensity of knowledge spillovers)
Demand parameters
pi Product price
A Maximum willingness to pay by consumers
 2 [0; 1] Degree of substitutability between the products of the two rms
(indicator of competitive pressure)
Table 1: Summary of the notation used in the model. The choice variables and parameters are
reported only for rm i, for simplicity
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The ratio
AE
BE
is equal to
AE
BE
=
4(1 + rB
2
B) 2(2  )rAAB
2(2  )(1 + rA2A)  4rBAB
(19)
 does not appear in
AE
BE
: The claims for ;  are immediate, since the numerator in increasing in these
parameters, while the denominator is decreasing. 2A appears only in the denominator, which is increasing in
this parameter, while 2B appears only in the numerator, which is also increasing in the parameter. Finally,
the numerator is increasing in B while the denominator is decreasing in this parameter. The opposite is
true for A:
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Proof of Proposition 2 We rst compute
@AE
@ and
@AE
@ :
@AE
@
=

Ak

4(1 + rB
2
B) 2(2  )rAAB

+

AB(A c)+A(1 + ) k2rrAAB

 
k

AB(A c)+A(1 + ) h4(1 + rB2B)  2 (2  ) ArABi (
 2
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i
(2  2   )
 4 2(2  ) ABkrAB+ 2 4(1 + ) ABkrAB
)
2
(20)
@BE
@
=

Ak

2(2  )(1 + rA2B) 4rBAB

  AB(A c)+A(1 + ) k2(1 + rA2B)


 k AB(A c)+A(1 + ) 2(2  )(1 + rA2B) 4rBAB (
 2
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i
(2  2   )
 4 2(2  ) ABkrAB+ 2 4(1 + ) ABkrAB
)
2
(21)
where =
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i

h
Bk(1 + rB
2
B)  2(1 + )(2  )
i
  4(1 + ) ABkrAB
 2(2  ) ABkrAB  : @AE@ is the di¤erence of two quantities. The rst one is always positive,
while the second one is itself the product of two quantities: the rst one is always positive (being the
numerator of AE), the second one (
@
@ ) has an ambiguous sign. When ! 0, we have:
@
@
=
n
 4
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i
  4 4 ABkrABo< 0;
since Ak(1 + rA2A)   4 from the second order conditions and 4   ABkrAB > 0 is implied by
AB <
1
r
2(2 )
AB(+2)2(2 ) :Then, overall, we have
@AE
@ > 0: Also
@BE
@ is the di¤erence of two quantities.
When  ! 0, the rst quantity is positive. The second one is the product of the numerator of BE , which
is always positive, and @@ , which is negative as we have just shown. Then, overall, we have
@BE
@ > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3 When  ! 0, we have:
@
@
=
n
 2(2  )
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i
  (4  2) 4 ABkrABo < 0: (22)
As shown in the previous proof, this implies
@AE
@ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 Consider
@BE
@ when  ! 1,  ! 1 and  ! 0: The rst quantity is negative,
since it is the product of   AB(A c) 18rAAB < 0 and  > 0. The second quantity is the product
of the numerator of BE , which is positive, and
@
@ , for which we have:
@
@
=
n
2
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i
  4 2 ABkrAB+ 2 2 ABkrABo
=
n
2
h
Ak(1 + rA
2
A)  4
i
+ 8 + 2ABkrAB
o
> 0: (23)
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Proof of Proposition 5 If  = 0; we have:
AE =
4k[AB(A c)+A]
h
4(1+rB
2
B) 4ArAB
i
[Ak(1+rA2A) 4][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i
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Computing
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AE
@k , we obtain:
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which has the same sign as:
 k2AB
h
(1 + rA2A)
B(1 + rB2B)  r2(AB)2AB
i
: (27)
This quantity is negative since AB < AB: Thus, AE is decreasing in k. Since
dk
d = 2(2 + )(2  3),
k is increasing in  when  < 23 , and decreasing otherwise. This implies that 
A
E is decreasing in  when
 < 23 , and increasing for  >
2
3 .
Proof of Proposition 7 In equilibrium, the agents participation constraint will bind:
E(Ui) = 0 + 
A
E

AE
A

+ BE

BE + 
B

+ 

BE + 
B

  (28)
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
AE
A
2
2
 
B

BE+
B
2
2
  r
2
h 
AEA
2
+
 
BEB
2
+ 2AE
B
EAB
i
= u;
where the equilibrium values for e¤orts are substituted into the expression. u is the reservation utility for
the scientist. Simplifying the expression, we are left with:
E(U i) = 0+
 
AE
2
2A
(1  r2A)+
 
BE
2
2B
(1  r2B)  rAEBEAB+
2
2B
+
BE
B
(29)
For r ! 0; at the limit the previous expression reduces to
E(U i) = 0+
 
AE
2
2A
+
 
BE
2
2B
+
2
2B
+
BE
B
: (30)
The quantity
(AE)
2
2A
+
(BE)
2
2B
+ 
2
2B
+
BE
B
is increasing in  since all its terms are increasing in . As
a consequence, 0, the xed component of wage, is decreasing in  in order for E(Ui) to be constant. A
numerical example in which 0 is increasing in  at least for some values of  is r = 5; A = 2; c = 1;
 =  = 0:5; 2A = 
2
B = 1; AB = 0:01; 
A = B = 1: Under this parameterization, we obtain
@0
@ = 0:002519  1:1067, which is positive when  is su¢ ciently low ( < 0:0022).
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Proof of Proposition 6 Immediate by inspection of expressions (17) and (18), since  appears only in
the two numerators, which are both increasing in :
Proof of Proposition 8 If r ! 0, then E(w) = u+ (
A
E)
2
2A
+
(BE)
2
2B
  2
2B
: Di¤erentiating with respect
to , we obtain @E(w)@ = B(1 + )A + A(1 + )B   , which is positive for  ! 0: An example for
which @E(w)@ is always increasing in  is A = 2; c = 1;  = 1;  = 0:5; 
A = B = 1:5, from which
we get @E(w)@ = 1:5 + 0:85: An example for which
@E(w)
@ is decreasing in  for high  is A = 2; c = 1;
 = 0:2;  = 0:5; A = B = 5, from which we get @E(w)@ = 0:0398  0:1880:
Proof of Proposition 9 If we compute the cross-derivatives with respect to ; we obtain:
@2E(TS)
@Ai @
=
@qi
@
4
A(+ 2)(  2) +
qi
A
8
(4  2)2 > 0 (31)
@2E(TS)
@Bi @
=
@qi
@
4
B(+ 2)(  2) +
qi
B

8(  )
(4  2)2

> 0 (32)
Under symmetry (ci = cj), we get
@qi
@ =   (A c)(+2) . Notice that qi > (A c)(+2) and lim
A!1
B!1
qi =
(A c)
(+2) .
Then, supermodularity holds for all A and B if
2 > (2  ) (33)
4(  ) > (2  )(2  ) (34)
The rst inequality is satised if  > 23 . As the second inequality is concerned, we dene H(; ) =
4(  )  (2  )(2  ): We have:
@H(; )
@
= 4 + (2  ) + (2  ) > 0; (35)
H(; )j=0 = 6  4; (36)
@
@
=
8  4+ 4
12 + 4   4 > 0; (37)
where @@ is obtained using Dinis theorem on the implicit function H(; ). These results together imply
that @
2E(TS)
@Bi @
> 0 when  > (), with ()  23 and 0() > 0. Since this condition is stricter than
 > 23 , we have the claim.
Proof of Proposition 10 From (15) and (16), respectively, we obtain, after invoking symmetry:
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A
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k
h
2(2 )
B
i
  qi
h
2
B(2 )(2+)
i
: (39)
For ! 0; (39) is positive, so that we have the claim
Proof of Proposition 11 The proposition derives from Proposition 6 (page 15). We can also see that:
@E(TS)
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Ai @
= 2
h
1+
B(2+)
i h
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i
> 0; (40)
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i
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